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Abstract  
 
This article takes stock of Rwanda’s decentralisation by reviewing the existing evidence and 
putting them into perspective with the wider literature on decentralisation. It challenges the 
narrative that depicts the Rwandan decentralisation as a wholly negative or destabilising 
process by arguing that the focus of the scholarship on lack of popular participation should not 
ignore key dynamics that had significant stabilising effects. Yet, as the Rwandan economy and 
society are becoming more diversified, introduction of bottom-up mechanisms of decision-
making will be necessary in the future to enhance the government responsiveness to evolving 
local needs and ensure stability in the long run. 
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Introduction 
 
Started in 2000, the decentralisation in Rwanda has been extensive and wide-reaching. It has 
resulted in an entirely redrawn administrative map of the country, with renamed localities and 
significant resources and responsibilities pushed to the local level to an unprecedented extent. 
This has been done in three distinct phases. Phase 1, from 2000 to 2006, concentrated on 
reconciliation and cohesion, holding grassroots elections, and undertaking institutional and 
legal re-design. The prefectures became provinces, the communes below them districts 
(akarere). The second phase (2006 - 2011) resulted in a major institutional overhaul. The 
number of administrative structures was greatly reduced, from 11 provinces to 4, from 106 
districts to 30. Below, sectors (umurenge) were merged, as were cells below them. A new level 
was created, the village. The 30 districts are currently the main local governments of the 
country. They are decentralised administrative units, with financial autonomy and legal 
personality. They oversee 416 sectors and 2148 cells (akagali) that are only deconcentrated 
entities of the district. The 14,837 villages (imidugudu) are not formally an administrative 
entity but vehicles for community mobilisation. 
 
Furthermore, the names of all districts and of some towns were changed. Yearly performance 
contracts (imihigo) signed between district mayors and the President were instituted. The 
current third phase of decentralisation (2011-2016) focusses mainly with strengthening 
capacities at the local level and further transfers responsibilities and resources within the 
existing institutional framework. As the third and last phase of decentralisation is drawing to a 
close, the government’s aim in the coming years is to consolidate the progress made especially 
by supporting district staff skills and deepening the fiscal decentralisation.1  
 
As with many topics on the Rwandan post-genocide trajectory, the outcomes of 
decentralisation have been subject to debate. The dominant academic narrative on the 
Rwandan decentralisation underlines that it is not an instrument of greater citizens’ 
participation but that it remains mainly a tool of the authoritarian centre to penetrate further 
in society and exercise its power in a top-down manner. In doing so, the government repeats 
dangerous governance patterns of the past and creates the conditions for the future return of 
instability.2 Yet this literature has failed to analyse the Rwandan experience in light of the 
larger scholarship on decentralisation in developing countries and post conflict situation. Doing 
so, it overlooked evidence that decentralisation can be a perilous, destabilising process and 
consequently fails to appreciate important progress made in Rwanda. 
 
This article’s contribution to offer an alternative assessment of Rwanda’s decentralisation to 
the one commonly found in the literature. It challenges the dominant narrative that depicts 
the Rwandan decentralisation as wholly negative process, arguing that key dynamics have had 
significant stabilising effects. First, the Rwandan decentralisation has been essential in 
promoting development, making it a quite exceptional case on the African continent where 
the impact of decentralisation on poverty reduction has been often disappointing.3 Through 
tight monitoring of local governments underpinned by a result-oriented governance, and 
enhanced coordination of local officials, decentralisation has allowed the swift implementation 
of national developmental policies and significant progress in service delivery. Second, while 
the literature on Rwanda is justified underlining the serious issues of the lack of citizen 
empowerment, it however ignores the importance of sequencing in the decentralisation 
processes. It was important for other elements in tension with participation to be put in place 
first so that decentralisation could play a meaningful role in development. Finally, the article 
suggests that further analysis on how power is deployed territorially in Rwanda is needed. 
Although top-down, power might be currently exercised in a somewhat different manner from 
pre-1994 Rwanda, and thus has different implications in terms of a possible return of violence.  
 
The article begins by presenting the methodology and a simple framework to assess 
decentralisation along two components: service delivery and poverty reduction on one hand, 
and governance on the other. It then turns its attention to the impact of decentralisation on 
service delivery and development in Rwanda, showing the mechanisms through which 
significant development progress could be achieved. The third section assesses 
decentralisation against the governance criteria. It concurs with the dominant analysis that 
decentralisation has so far largely failed to deliver its promise in terms of governance, but 
balances this analysis highlighting the importance of reform sequencing in the context of post-
genocide Rwanda. It also suggests that the dominant analysis of state/society interface in 
Rwanda might fail to acknowledge some crucial ruptures with the past, potential factors of 
stability in the long run. The fourth section draws together and discusses the evidence 
presented in the previous sections. The article finally offers concluding reflections on the 
future of decentralisation and the conditions for its success in the long run. 
Assessing decentralisation 
Decentralisation can be defined as the transfer of administrative, financial and political 
responsibility and authority from higher (usually central) to lower levels of government.4 The 
expected benefits of decentralisation, although linked, can be analytically classified into two 
broad categories: benefits related to service delivery and poverty reduction and benefits 
related to governance. First, decentralisation is often embraced as an institutional 
arrangement to improve service delivery and poverty reduction.5 It is expected to bring 
services closer to the people by empowering local governments, and making services tailored 
to local realities.6 Allocative efficiency of public funds is expected to improve since local 
governments, through better access to locally specific information, are in a better position to 
prioritise resources more effectively than higher spheres of government.7 
 
Under what conditions these theoretical benefits of decentralisation can materialise is much 
disputed however. Evidence of decentralisation as decreasing poverty or improving service 
delivery in developing countries is ambivalent, if not disappointing. Some main causes 
commonly associated with the disappointing results of decentralisation include inadequate 
institutional arrangements, resources and local skills.8 Additionally, local elite often captures 
decentralised resources and power, increasing inequities in service delivery.9 Decentralisation 
can also undermine budget discipline, leading local governments to engage in unconstrained 
expenditures because of the expectation that the centre will always bail them out.10 Finally, 
decentralisation can undermine economies of scale in public investment and public service 
production.11 
 
In the second category, decentralisation can improve governance because it gives the 
population a shorter route for holding officials accountable. Instead of being accountable only 
to central government, local officials’ careers can become more dependent on the citizens. 
They are thus more likely to be responsive to local needs.12 Decentralisation can deepen 
democracy by providing alternative route of entry for new politicians. It can also have 
stabilising effects by allowing voices of citizens to be heard and limit abuses of power from the 
centre.13  
 
On the other hand, the political accountability that decentralisation is supposed to foster “is 
particularly affected by the likelihood of corruption or capture by interest groups”14 as it 
creates new opportunities for clientelism, and makes politicians, and the bureaucrats under 
them, less autonomous from local interest groups.15 Decentralisation can have a destabilising 
effect by opening new arenas of political competitions, especially in post-conflict and deeply 
divided societies.16 
 
This article aims at assessing the Rwandan decentralisation against these two broad goals: 
service delivery and poverty reduction, and governance. The main obstacle in assessing 
decentralisation is the difficulty of attributing effects (e.g. better service delivery) to 
decentralisation itself, as many other factors are likely to come into play as well.17 
Furthermore, as decentralisation is usually a nation-wide process, as is the case in Rwanda, no 
counterfactuals in the country are available to assess what would have happened without 
decentralisation. Consequently, the article does not attempt to assess quantitatively the 
impact of decentralisation. Rather, it focuses on the institutional arrangement and 
mechanisms introduced and their likely effects, and analyses to what extent decentralisation 
stayed clear of the risks inherent to the process, as highlighted in the literature. To do so, the 
common distinction between the administrative, political and financial dimensions of 
decentralisation are used. The article will refer to the classic distinction between 
deconcentration, where responsibilities are transferred to central government’s local 
administrative units, delegation, where governmental functions are contracted to private or 
public entities, and devolution, where autonomous local government with elected officials are 
elected.18 The article is based on a review of the literature and on the author’s fieldwork trips 
in Rwanda between 2013 and 2016. The combined duration of fieldwork in Rwanda has 
amounted to over one year.  
Decentralisation, service delivery and poverty reduction 
Service delivery and poverty reduction have improved greatly in Rwanda since 2000.19 
Although inequalities remain high in the country, the GDP per capita increased of 4.8% on 
average per year between 2000 and 2015.20 Rwanda is one of the few countries to have 
reached most of its Millennium Development Goals.21 It made significant improvements in 
terms of service delivery. For instance, between 2000 and 2014, maternal mortality decreased 
from 1071 to 210 maternal deaths per 100.000 live births, infant mortality from 107 to 32 per 
1,000 live birth and school net enrolment increased from 72.6% to 96.8%.22  
 
The impact of the institutional transformation brought about by decentralisation on improving 
poverty reduction and service delivery needs to be demonstrated. Three main mechanisms can 
explain why decentralisation can be credited for much of the developmental progress locally in 
Rwanda.  
Resources and services closer to the people 
The first mechanism is that services have been brought closer to the population by providing 
local governments with significant resources and skills to deliver and monitor them. This is 
because the Rwandan government, unlike in other decentralisation experiences, has not shied 
away from transferring significant human and financial resources locally. 
 
Districts received in the 2014/2015 fiscal year 15% of the national budget, executing in total 
21% of the central budget,23 putting Rwanda at the same level of countries like Uganda, which 
however started its decentralisation process a decade earlier.24 Rwanda’s 30 district 
headquarters are now little governments in themselves. Following a 2014 reform, they now 
employ 85 staff each overseeing education, health, agriculture, infrastructure, water and 
sanitation, private sector development, social protection, youth sport and culture. They are in 
charge of the sectors (umurenge) that are the main administrative units for service delivery, 
supervising schools and health centres and delivering administrative documents. 
 
The central government has also empowered this local government workforce so that it can 
fulfil its mandate. Empowerment first concerns skills. All districts’ and some sectors’ staff 
(including the executive secretary and the internal auditor) are required to be university 
graduate. The goal is not only to have skilled staff, it is also to boost their capacity to oversee 
effectively service providers. For instance, since 2013, directors of district health units have 
been required to hold a Master’s degree in a move to eliminate any inferiority complex 
relating to education of the directors towards the medical staff (especially doctors) which 
could hinder effective oversight. Empowerment of local officials has also occurred in terms of 
salary and status. In the civil service, mayors have the rank of ministerial Permanent 
Secretaries (PS), district executive secretaries the rank of central state’s Director General. The 
416 sector executive secretaries have a rank of Director of a central ministry. They all have the 
corresponding salaries, except mayors who are one category below the PS on the salary 
scale.25 Overall, this demonstrates a genuine commitment to empower the districts in their 
mandate, which stands in stark contrast with the frequent reluctance of central governments 
elsewhere to provide local government with adequate resources in the process of 
decentralisation.26 As a consequence, services are closer to the population. There is no need to 
travel to Kigali or to the provincial capital as in the past to get administrative documents. 
Health centres are overseen by sectors officials and not by officials from the central 
administration in Kigali. 
 
While districts have emerged as formidable implementation and delivery instruments, they 
remain limited planning instruments.27 The centre retains most of the power to decide what 
performance targets should be achieved by districts during the yearly planning consultations 
with the districts. Furthermore, districts have limited discretionary power on the use of funds. 
Close to 80% of transfers from central government are in the form of funds earmarked for 
precise activities, mainly related to service delivery.28 This remains however lower than in 
Uganda for instance.29 Furthermore, a large proportion of discretionary funds (block grants) is 
absorbed by salary payment in Rwanda. 
 Nonetheless, it would be wrong to analyse districts as only informally deconcentrated 
implementation agencies from the centre. Consultation with the centre for planning occurs in 
an institutionalised manner, where districts can assert their views on the choice of activities 
and targets, although the view of the centre often, yet not always, prevail. Districts have a 
significant leeway in terms of infrastructure construction. They are in charge of planning and 
procurement. For instance, districts entirely manage school construction, choosing the 
location of the new schools and the contractor. For local economic development infrastructure 
(markets, handicraft centres, slaughter houses…), districts are free to decide what to build and 
where to build using their capital block grant envelope. Districts also remain free to determine 
the spending of their own locally-raised revenues. Sectors are increasingly empowered as they 
can now procure infrastructure and goods as well.  
Norm of result-oriented governance 
Decentralisation of resources has been paralleled with the promotion of a norm of result-
oriented governance. The main instrument for that is the yearly mayoral performance contract 
(imihigo), which has led to increased pressure on the bureaucracy and on local politicians to 
achieve the central government’s ambitious targets. The extremely high turnover of district 
mayors in Rwanda is a testimony to the importance of performance as a criterion of 
politicians’ rotation. Since 2006, when the local administration was redesigned and the imihigo 
implemented, only two mayors managed to serve their two full five-year terms without being 
ousted from their seat.30 Overall, the top-down pressure from the centre, epitomised in the 
imihigo system, has resulted in a culture of result delivery at the lowest level of the state 
apparatus.31 However, the narrowness of imihigo indicators, coupled with the pressure to 
achieve them, has created perverse incentives. They include blunt, harsh policy 
implementation by local officials, more eager to reach their narrowly defined targets, rather 
than a focus on meeting the local population’s needs. This can lead to coercion to get policy 
implemented, such as fining, destroying property, confiscating livestock, denying 
administrative document to noncompliant citizens.32 Imihigo also create incentives to cook or 
“technicate” (guteknica in Kinyarwanda) local governance performance numbers. However, 
the educational effects on local officials of result-oriented governance in the context of low 
capacity of post genocide Rwanda should not be underestimated. This culture “of getting 
things done” that has trickled down in the state apparatus is credited in different case studies 
for much developmental results in sectors such as health or education for instance. 33  
Decentralisation as solving collective action problem.  
The third mechanism through which decentralisation has supported economic development 
and service delivery is enhanced coordination of local state services. Coordination of local 
officials in a centralised, or merely deconcentrated, bureaucracy can be difficult as all 
bureaucrats do not report to the same line ministries. In Rwanda, responsibilities were not 
simply transferred from line ministries to local offices (which would amount to 
deconcentration), they were all gathered under the responsibility of the district governments, 
solving collective action problems associated with service delivery.34 Districts pay the salaries 
of doctors, nurses and teachers and oversees health centres, hospital and schools. As a 
consequence, the production of services is eased by the collaboration of different services. As 
one informant said, the district is “a conductor that has authority on everyone”.35 For instance, 
as observed in the Southern Province, sensitisation in schools to the community-based health 
insurance (mutuelle) is facilitated by the fact that both educational and health services, and 
the targets they have to reach, are the responsibilities of the districts. 
 
This “coordination effect” also comes into full play when development is co-produced with the 
population. First, districts are better able to get the population involved to co-produce services 
and infrastructure, for instance by becoming community health workers, building radical 
terraces to fight erosion or fix feeder roads through communal works (umuganda). In the 
absence of decentralisation, this can be hindered by the lack of coordination between local 
authorities, in charge of mobilising the population, and line ministries. Second, the 
decentralisation of services has increased the possibility for citizens to monitor service delivery 
through, for instance, joining a health committee overseeing a health centre. These different 
processes are well summarised by Chambers and Golooba-Mutebi when they argue that, 
among the factors explaining significant improvement in maternal health,  
 
the existence of a collaborative space within which local actors come 
together is also important. Advisory and oversight committees which bring 
together service providers and local authorities, function and play an 
important role in ensuring that local actors are working towards the same 
objectives and pulling in the same direction.36 
 
Decentralisation and Governance 
The scholarship on the Rwandan local state nearly unanimously maintains that the impact of 
decentralisation on local governance is overall negative. Scholars argue that decentralisation 
has created the condition for future instability and violence because it does not provide space 
for popular participation while making the state penetrating always deeper in society and 
extending its control.37 Such assessment should not however ignore key dynamics in the 
Rwandan decentralisation that have significant stability effects.  
Decentralisation: a cause of future violence?  
The political space at the local, as in the central, level is greatly restricted. Districts mayors’ 
elections are indirect, the result of four tiers of elections starting at cell level, giving ample 
space for the centre to intervene.38 Local leaders are mainly drawn from the ranks of the ruling 
RPF –as of March 2015, all mayors but one were RPF39– which means that the RPF has power 
to make and un-make careers. As a result, the Rwandan decentralisation has hardly produced 
a shorter route for holding officials accountable. It has also not proved to be a route for new 
politicians to enter politics, as the ruling RPF holds the role of gatekeeper centrally. 
 Consequently, the Rwandan decentralisation is often analysed as dispatching rather than 
decentralizing political power, which would create a conducive ground for the return 
violence.40 This pervasive diagnostic in the literature, well-articulated in Niamh Gaynor’s article 
in this issue, deserves further examination before offering some qualifications to it. 
 
The argument is that the nature of the Rwandan decentralisation, advanced in the 
administrative and financial sphere but limited politically, reinforces the ubiquity and strength 
of an authoritarian state by maintaining top-down structures of power. By doing so, it may 
reproduce what Uvin has designated as “structural violence”.41 The concept, borrowed from 
Galtung, refers to the situation where human beings’ “realizations are below their potential 
realizations”42 and when this situation is not directly created by individuals but results from a 
structure, e.g. inequality of power or unequal access to opportunities. Uvin argued that the 
“humiliation of top-down development”43 compounded by the aid industry made it “almost 
impossible for ordinary people’s voices to be heard.”44 In 1994, this was a crucial contributing 
factor to the genocide as it “provoked a need for scapegoating among ordinary people [while] 
the existence of long-standing racism allowed parts of the elite to use this need to build a 
genocidal movement.”45 Currently, the maintenance of top-down planning and officials’ 
sometimes harsh implementation measures, coupled with the little progress in political 
decentralisation, would reproduce such structural violence. This kind of decentralisation, by 
denying voice while achieving performance at an excessive social cost could potentially lead to 
re-emergence of instability.46  
Some stabilising effects of the Rwandan decentralisation  
This dominant narrative linking the Rwandan decentralisation and potential return to conflict 
must however be qualified.  
Trade-off and sequencing 
First of all, the persistence of top-down structure of power and lack of popular participation 
has to be balanced against the destabilising effects of political decentralisation, especially 
given the country’s lack of capacity and recent history of mass violence. The tangible headways 
in the decentralisation’s administrative and financial dimensions, while the political side is 
lagging behind, can also decrease the probability for the whole process to be derailed. 
 
Although relatively few studies investigate the impact of sequencing on the success of 
decentralisation, they all underline that sequencing is important.47 Consequently, snapshot 
analyses of the Rwandan decentralisation highlighting the excessive upward accountability of 
officials might not consider a key cause of success on the long run: adequate sequencing of 
reforms.  
 
In the administrative sphere, putting in place solid systems and skills locally before progress on 
the financial and political front reduces the risk of failure of the decentralisation process.48 
Political and financial decentralisation without adequate capacity can be unproductive. For 
instance, Loayza et al. found that in Peru, poor local capacity was a bigger constraint to local 
government effectiveness than budget allocation, difficulties to identify local needs or political 
economy considerations.49 Tight oversight of officials by the centre, and restriction on their 
discretionary use of funds might consequently be a necessary first step in the process of 
decentralisation while capacity is weak. For instance, deconcentration of services, i.e. their 
transfer to lower levels with providers and supervisors still accountable to the centre, before 
their effective devolution can decrease the risk of their disruption when full decentralisation is 
undertaken. The tradition of deconcentrated services in Indonesia for example explains why 
the country managed to maintain continuous service delivery despite its “big bang” approach 
to decentralisation in the early 2000s. Conversely, the absence of deconcentrated services 
prior to full decentralisation in Latin America accounts for the fragility and reversal of the 
process in several countries.50 In Rwanda, the effective decentralisation of service delivery, but 
the limited decentralisation of their planning, and the tight control of the centre on finance 
can be viewed as a healthy process rather than an inherent shortcoming of decentralisation. 
 
In the financial sphere, putting in place a robust and comprehensive fiscal framework, and 
ensuring hard budget constraints constitute pre-requisite to minimise corruption and galloping 
deficit leading to macro-economic instability.51 In this light, the continuous deepening of fiscal 
decentralisation in Rwanda in parallel with the limited (albeit increasing) discretion in the 
expenditure of district funds can also be interpreted as a healthy process rather than solely a 
lack of empowerment of districts by the centre.  
 
In the political sphere of decentralisation, in their race for newly decentralised power, local 
groups are likely to capture public resources, instrumentalise political identities, resort to 
patronage, and exacerbate historical divisions. Decentralisation not only becomes unable to 
deliver its developmental promises, but also exacerbates social tensions.52 In Rwanda, the risk 
of centrifugal forces associated with political decentralisation has been especially acute since 
1994 as, besides the deep division in society after the horrors of the genocide, the distinction 
between the Hutu majority population and the new Tutsi ruling elite overlapped to a certain 
extent with the rural/urban divide.53 
 
In the light of the broader literature on decentralisation, the reluctance of the Rwandan 
government not to give too much financial, administrative and political leeway to districts can 
be re-assessed. Despite the dangers of decentralisation, there was political will to begin the 
process. The abysmal level of officials’ capacities, the tradition of state centralisation, and 
deep social divisions created a significant risk of derailment. To avoid this prospect, the 
government gave more power to the local level, yet kept tight control of planning and 
resource allocation to ensure that decentralisation will not hinder, but rather serve, its 
developmental ambitions. Crucially, the fear of losing control of the decentralisation process is 
compounded by the fact that fast-paced development has been embraced as the prime 
legitimation strategy of the Tutsi-led RPF. This embrace has been all the more powerful as the 
RPF political legitimacy was very low since, after reaching power during the genocide targeting 
the Tutsi, it ruled over a Hutu majority exposed for decades to an anti-Tutsi ideology. 
  
The rare instances of recentralisation of state functions amidst the general trend of 
decentralisation in Rwanda exemplify the awareness of the government that decentralisation 
can potentially be a double-edged sword that can support, but also derail its development 
project. Transferring responsibilities locally cannot, in the government’s mind, occur at the 
expenses of state capacity. When districts were obviously unable to manage some of the new 
responsibilities devolved to them, these responsibilities have been recentralised. The recent 
examples of tax collection and management of the Rwandan Community-based insurance 
(CBHI, also called mutuelles) are revealing in this respect. Regarding the former, whereas the 
district used to be in charge of collecting all revenues locally, property, business, revenue and 
rental tax collection have been recentralised in the hand of the Rwanda Revenue Authority 
(RRA) in 2014 following the disappointing performance of districts.54 Similarly, the CBHI has 
been historically managed at sector-level. Yet, a series of scandals about mismanagement of 
funds and lack of capacity have led to the transfer of the responsibility of the CBHI to the 
Rwandan Social Security Board (RSSB) to increase professionalism and strengthen budget 
accountability.55 These examples are also further testimony of the importance of sequencing 
decentralisation, building capacity first before empowering the local level. 
Qualifying structural violence? 
 
The second main qualification to the poor governance track record of the Rwandan 
decentralisation concerns the exact magnitude of the “structural violence”. Structural 
violence, while real, must be seen against the benefits that the top-down exercise of power 
created in terms of development. As mentioned, the concept of structural violence is the 
situation where individuals cannot reach their full potential. While decentralisation has not 
allowed citizens to engage in decision-making, or voice their aspirations and exasperation, it 
has, on the other hand, contributed to Rwandans getting closer to their full potential through 
better access to education, reduced maternal and child mortality, access to locally planned and 
built markets or handicraft centres, to name but a few. 
 
Furthermore, the extent to which structural violence in Rwanda resembles the past, and might 
consequently produce the same effect, can be challenged. Undoubtedly, the ethos of policy 
implementation is problematic in Rwanda given its harsh nature, and the lack of popular 
consultation. Yet, the portrayal in the literature of the Rwandan decentralisation as the 
continuity of pre-1994 patterns of governance, likely to produce similar effect’s, should be 
further interrogated. First, it remains unclear if current structures of local governance can be 
seen as the continuity of the pre-1994 era, producing similarly “structural violence”. Especially, 
the unconstrained power of local officials, heralded as a main cause of structural violence, 
might deserve further research. For instance, is the structure of incentives facing current 
district mayors equivalent to ones of the bourgmestres of the Habyarimana regime? 
Undoubtedly, mayors as former bourgmestres owe their position more to the ruling party than 
to elections, and their loyalty flows towards the top rather than the population. Yet, mayors’ 
power might be more constrained than those of the bourgmestre of pre-1994 Rwanda. Their 
selection, as demonstrated elsewhere, has as much to do with political loyalty as 
performance.56 Top local officials in Rwanda apparently are not above the law. A telling 
example was the resignation and arrest, widely covered by the media in late 2014 and early 
2015, of three mayors (and several other officials) over inflating the mutuelles enrolment 
numbers for a better score at the imihigo evaluation.57 
 
The exact nature of bottom-up pressures on local officials in Rwanda in general, and in 
comparison to their pre-1994 counterparts in particular, can also be further interrogated. For 
instance, media is often cited by local officials as playing a crucial role in putting pressure 
them. As explained by a district health officer, “the community calls on the radio to say that 
something is not working [que quelque chose ne va pas] and if I can’t explain it to the mayor, 
there’s going to be trouble [ça chauffe!].58 A vice mayor interviewed concurred: the media “are 
killing us […] we are joking but we say that one should close the journalism schools.”59 
Directors of hospital receive training in how to handle the media and avoid scandal.60 While 
media is tightly monitored by the state in Rwanda, it does not mean that some freedom of 
expression is not selectively allowed, not to debate politics and national policies indeed, but to 
support the implementation of policies and ensure quality service delivery. 
 
Such a role of the media is supported by the fact that a national policy encourages all local 
government officials to be easily accessible to the population and media. For example, local 
officials must have their photographs and their phone numbers on the door of their offices so 
they can be called anytime by anyone.61 Walking in any local (and national) government 
buildings in Rwanda revealed that this measure is systematically enforced. Furthermore, the 
phone numbers and e-mails of all presidents of district councils, district executive secretaries 
and district agronomists were public on the website of the Rwanda Association of Local 
Government Authorities (RALGA).62 This indicates a general concern to make the bureaucracy 
more accessible to the people. 
 
These observations suggest that the interface between state and society might not be as blunt 
as elsewhere suggested. More research is needed using a comparative perspective to 
understand whether local officials in the post-genocide state are as free in their exercise of 
power as their counterparts of the Second Republic era given the requirements for 
performance and accessibility they have to meet. In other words, the local officials under the 
RPF government subject to a dense web of formal and informal monitoring and evaluations of 
their performance might be less of the “little gods” than Habyarimana’s prefects and 
bourgmestres were, with the favourable consequences this can have on in terms of “structural 
violence”.  
 
Discussion 
 
At first sight, the Rwandan decentralisation can be assessed as having tangible benefits in 
terms of service delivery and local economic development while producing detrimental effects 
regarding governance. Indeed, it has not yielded its promise of greater citizens’ participation 
while the top-down pressure on officials has pushed some to resort to coercion for policy 
implementation, fostering popular resentment. However, evaluating decentralisation must 
take into account the constraints inherent to the post-conflict period and the cost of “doing 
nothing”. In other words, assessment of the Rwandan decentralisation must be as much about 
its actual effects as about counterfactuals. i.e. about what would have happened if it would 
have occurred differently or not at all. 
 
Without decentralisation, such development progress in Rwanda would have been unlikely, 
while issues of popular participation would not have been any better. The issue of 
authoritarianism is arguably not an issue of decentralisation itself but a broader one pertaining 
to the nature of the political regime. Decentralisation could be said to have a negative impact 
as it has reinforced the pressure on local officials to implement policy, thus creating incentive 
for them to resort to coercion. Yet, had the state remained as centralised, the political elite 
would have still embraced development as a legitimation strategy and put pressure officials to 
deliver the national developmental project. Structural violence does not need a decentralised 
state to occur, as pre-1994 Rwanda amply demonstrates. The only key difference is that, by 
being decentralised, more pressured officials are deployed closer to the people. While this 
issue is undeniable, it must be balanced against what such process has allowed in terms of 
development. It also requires further interrogating the extent to which counter dynamics for 
holding officials accountable to the population in terms of policy implementation and service 
delivery are emerging.  
 
Current decentralisation in Rwanda can also be criticised on the basis that a different form of 
decentralisation, not breaking its promise of citizen empowerment, could have emerged. Yet, 
against the backdrop of the academic evidence of the centrifugal forces inherent to 
decentralisation, and given the deep divisions running through Rwanda’s society, and the low 
capacity of the state and its scarce resources, the space for a radical alternative form of 
decentralisation to emerge was arguably limited. At least incremental decentralisation, with 
the centre keeping a strong hand on the process, has allowed the government to pull the hat 
trick of simultaneously developing the country, staying clear of the pitfalls of corruption, local 
elite capture and lack of capacity, while creating properly financed and staffed structure of 
decentralised government.  
 
Conclusion: the way forward 
 
This article offered an alternative view of the decentralisation process in Rwanda to what is 
usually found in the literature. It argued that, given the constraints faced by Rwanda after the 
genocide, and more generally in the light of the experience of decentralisation in poor and/or 
post conflict countries, depicting the Rwandan decentralisation in a more favourable light is 
warranted. To do so, it first sought to uncover the causal mechanisms between 
decentralisation and developmental progress in Rwanda. It highlighted that decentralisation 
had a positive impact on development through the significant transfers of resource and skills 
to the local level, the coordination mechanisms it created, and the result-oriented norms it 
promoted in the local bureaucracy. In the governance sphere, the article qualified the overall 
negative narrative on the destabilisation effects of decentralisation. Undoubtedly, how local 
governance operates in Rwanda has worrying shortcomings. Yet, these shortcomings can also 
be explained by the double imperative the Rwandan elite faced: deliver development to 
support its political legitimation while maintaining stability in the context of extreme social 
divisions following the genocide. In this context, a decentralisation of responsibilities and 
resources paralleled with the safeguard of the central government’s influence can be seen as 
important for decentralisation to succeed in the long run. 
 
This argument bears some methodological implication. Given the exceptional character of the 
recent Rwandan history and trajectory, assessment should adopt a comparative perspective. 
Comparisons across time is needed, whether to underline and question the repetition of 
dangerous governance patterns, or simply to keep in mind the extraordinary situation the 
countries faced not so long time ago. Comparison across space is also required. Examining the 
scholarship on decentralisation experiences in developing countries reveals that, unlike what 
has happened in many African countries, Rwanda’s decentralisation has been associated with 
poverty reduction and absence of elite capture. Assessment should also take counterfactuals 
into account. Decentralisation cannot be solely evaluated against some ideal criteria of 
development and governance. It must be also assessed relative to what would have been the 
cost of not decentralising, and what is the space for radically alternative forms of 
decentralisation to emerge. The article argues that the current form of decentralisation is 
better than the maintenance of centralisation. It also suggests that the recent history of the 
country makes a strong argument for a significant degree of control from the central 
government. 
 
Does this means that such a situation should persist indefinitely and that incremental 
improvements in state/citizen should be secondary because of the past and of local 
governments’ limited capacities? It should not. As stated by Smoke, “to argue that such 
problems justify maintaining centralisation is equivalent to condoning permanent 
authoritarian regimes in countries where people are poorly educated and unfamiliar with 
democracy.”63 The risk represented by the lack of voice for citizen is real. Such situations can 
be explainable, as argued here, in the exceptional situation of post-genocide Rwanda, but it is 
dangerous in the future. While a strong centre might be the condition of a successful 
decentralisation initially, as the last phase of decentralisation comes to an end in 2016, further 
empowerment of citizens is a condition of its ultimate success now that the institutions staffed 
with increasingly capable officials are in place. The government must understand that what 
has made decentralisation a success so far, i.e. the preservation of a strong role of the centre, 
could also lead to its future failure. As the Rwandan economy and society are becoming more 
differentiated, the introduction of bottom-up mechanisms of decision-making will be 
necessary to enhance the government responsiveness to evolving and increasingly 
differentiated local needs and expectations. Planning public activities from the top is efficient 
only in a very low-skills and resource-constrained environment, as in the case of the post-
genocide period. Yet, the preservation of the predominant role of the centre will lead to 
increasing inefficiency. A case can epitomise this point. As part of the flagship, and costly, 
policy of one-laptop per child, aiming at providing pupils with a basic laptop to teach them IT 
skills, laptops were delivered to districts. Yet, many computers have simply never been opened 
and used, as highlighted in the Office of the Auditor’s General Report.64 The cause is simple. 
Bureaucrats at the centre considered it would be an excellent initiative, without wondering if 
this was meeting real local needs and if any teacher knew how to use a laptop. Asking districts 
what they think would have helped to identify early on the limits of the programme design, or 
helped to put in place accompanying measures, such as adequate teachers’ training. This 
mundane example is revealing of the limit of an exclusively top-down model of development 
and the diminishing returns it will produce. 
 
The ultimate question is if the ruling elite, caught between the anxiety of avoiding any risks 
inherent to decentralisation and their need to create fast development for political 
legitimation, will engage on this path. This is not impossible. If development is so important for 
elite legitimation, the government may realise that it will not be able to develop the country 
without more bottom-up system of planning in order to make the local governments more 
responsive to the population needs. In addition, the growing resources and skills of local 
governments should make the ruling elite more trusting of local system and potentially willing 
to give districts more leeway to articulate local needs. If this does not happen, any effort 
towards development will be doomed by ever diminishing returns and the rise of popular 
discontent. 
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